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This essay seeks to reconstruct the terms for a more productive engagement with 
Kant than is typical within contemporary academic cultural Marxism which sees 
him as the cornerstone of a bourgeois model of the aesthetic. The essay argues that 
in the ‘Critique of Judgment’ the aesthetic stands in as a substitute for the missing 
realm of human praxis. This argument is developed in relation to Kant’s concept of 
reflective judgment that is in turn related to a methodological shift towards 
inductive and analogical procedures that help Kant overcome the dualisms of the 
first two Critiques. This reassessment of Kant’s aesthetic is further clarified by 
comparing it with and offering a critique of Terry Eagleton’s assessment of the 
Kantian aesthetic as synonymous with ideology. 
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For bourgeois aesthetics, Kant remains a vital touchstone and 
ideological resource.  But can Marxist cultural theory find (or 
perhaps recover) a more productive engagement with Kant other 
than casting him as a bourgeois elitist, formalist, dualist and idealist? 
Historically it has. That Benjamin, Kracauer and Adorno were all 
profoundly influenced by Kant is often repressed by contemporary 
cultural Marxism as Kaufman has noted (2000). More recently Slavoj 
Zizek has rediscovered what Adorno’s Negative Dialectics once 
showed us, the fruitfulness of a productive engagement with Kant’s 
antinomies, which resist any facile ‘identity’ between subject and 
object (2006). Zizek was inspired to write his book The Parallax View 
by Kojin Karatini’s cross-fertilization between Marx and Kant in his 
book Transcritique (2005). But Kant’s aesthetics, with the important 
exception of the work of Jacques Ranciere, remain largely 
unredeemable for political radicals. Bourdieu’s assault on middle 
class cultural capital was launched in the name of an anti-Kantian 
critique (1996). For Terry Eagleton, Kant’s aesthetic, as we shall see 
later, is virtually synonymous with ideology (1997). For Lukács, Kant 
exemplifies the dualism of bourgeois consciousness in which an 
abstract formal rationalism must view the content of life, experience 
and the material substratum, as irrational, because even in the 
qualified rationalism of Kant, only form (separated from the messy 
historical contingency of content) could be truly lawful (1971). 
Against this Lukács argued: 
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…praxis can only be really established as a philosophical 
principle if, at the same time, a conception of form can be 
found whose basis and validity no longer rest on that pure 
rationality and that freedom from every definition of 
content. In so far as the principle of praxis is the 
prescription for changing reality, it must be tailored to the 
concrete material substratum of action if it is to impinge 
upon it to any effect (1971, 126). 
 
In Critique of Practical Reason, ethical practical activity is locked up in 
the private individual subject, self-generated, inwardly orientated and 
uncoupled from ‘external’ institutional practices that must obey the a 
priori laws of nature mapped out in the Critique of Pure Reason. Thus 
the ethical act ‘collapses as soon as the first concrete content is to be 
created’ (Lukács 1971, 125). Lukács however has very little to say 
about the Critique of Judgment in History and Class Consciousness and 
seems not to register how the third critique marks a methodological 
break in some significant ways from the first two critiques.   
 
I want to argue that in Critique of Judgment, the aesthetic anticipates   
the missing realm of human praxis in the absence of the historical 
conditions that would allow praxis to be articulated in social scientific 
terms. This of course could also be said of our own period, although 
for different historical reasons.  In the aesthetic mode, Kant begins to 
sketch out an objectivity that is permeated with subjectivity and a 
subjectivity that is permeated with objectivity. I want to argue that 
the key concept by which Kant tentatively formulated an embryonic 
notion of praxis is that of reflective judgment.  That this concept can 
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be related to the natural and social sciences is an indication of its 
potential for knowledge production, which then takes a particular 
form in the aesthetic mode. Kant seems to associate the concept of 
reflective judgment with a methodological shift in which induction 
and analogy come to play a key role in his attempts to overcome the 
divisions between form and content, lawfulness and material 
substratum, subject and object.  Induction and analogy I argue help 
Kant to begin to sketch the outlines of the two key interrelated 
dimensions of materialism: physical materiality (and the sensuous 
perception of it) and social relations (which are not immediately 
given in their causal complexity to the senses).  
 
 
Reflective Judgment 
 
In the introduction to the Critique of Judgment Kant distinguishes 
between two types of judgment. Determinative judgment is the kind 
of judgment that the faculty of the understanding applies. Here the 
role of judgment is to subsume the particular under the general when 
the general is given (by the a priori laws of the understanding). The 
particular as it is received by the senses, is understood within the 
determinative laws of nature as projected by the faculty of the 
understanding.  This is a fairly mechanical process, leaving only a 
limited range for the imagination (the reproductive imagination), 
inference and hypothesis. The task for critical theory is to disentangle 
genuine objectivity (necessary because of the properties of nature 
and the historical and social circumstances that condition the 
transformative powers available to human kind) and reification. We 
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should be wary of merely reading the faculty of the understanding as 
an allegory of reification because even reification must rest on a real 
objective basis. As with Marx, we might say that for Kant, in a less self-
conscious way, nature is both a legitimate epistemological category 
and a category that denotes an ideological problem. This ambivalence 
can be detected in the gap between the pure a priori categories 
(quantity, quality, relation and modality) and all the various ways 
these pure laws can manifest themselves amongst diverse empirical 
phenomena. The very diversity of this phenomena suggests an 
analogy with the diversity of the phenomena we remake through our 
practices and this suggests both determination and freedom.   
 
 
Diverse phenomena Kant argues must ‘have a certain order in its 
particular rules’  (1987, 24) so that nature is not chaotic, but 
patterned.  If these ‘rules’ are to have some ultimate connection with 
the a priori necessary laws of the understanding, then judgment must 
presuppose that what looks contingent, local, and accidental, must by 
a web of laws that we are not aware of, connect up to a pattern of 
universal laws that are at least analogous with the laws of the 
understanding. Kant was no doubt thinking of how Newton’s theory 
of gravity superseded and incorporated more local and specific 
explanations of gravity offered by Kepler and Galileo.  
 
Although we do not know all the connections that link specific 
empirical local laws under the pure categories ‘we must necessarily 
presuppose and assume this unity, since otherwise our empirical 
cognition could not thoroughly cohere to [form] a whole of 
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experience’ (1987, 23).  This subjective presupposition of a unity of 
laws in the absence of their scientific proof is characteristic of the 
reflective judgment: 
 
…if only the particular is given and judgment has to find 
the universal for it, then this power is merely reflective. 
(1987,18-19). 
 
 
In contrast to the Critique of Pure Reason, the movement is bottom up 
rather than top down. This, combined with the fact that its starting 
point is that there are gaps in what we know, reflective judgment is 
orientated to discovery and openness; it is an attempt to recover 
from experience the particularities of it that are denied by the 
abstractions of the understanding which subsumes the particular 
under ‘universal’ concepts that are taken to be given.  One way of 
reading this is that it is an attempt by Kant, in part at least, to rescue 
experience from its imprisonment within the mechanical objectivity 
of concepts that are not really congruent with the many shades and 
dimensions of the particular (as Kant admitted with his distinction 
between how things appear to the understanding and the ‘thing in 
itself’).  In other words we can read the reflective judgment as a 
disguised project of ideological critique and even a proto-embryonic 
foundation for critical theory. Yet at the same time, it also has a clear 
application within the natural sciences that should not be conflated 
with ideological critique.  
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As Kant notes, scientific knowledge (and indeed everyday reason) 
can proceed by way of analogy. We often ‘use the principles by which 
we explain and understand one product in order to explain and grasp 
[begreifen] another as well, thereby making coherent experience out 
of material…’ (1987, 25). The basis of this analogical method is the 
assumption that nature is harmonizing (composed of relations) and 
that nature ultimately harmonizes with our own in built laws of the 
understanding. This in fact is the basis of pleasure, in both scientific 
investigation and, Kant suggests, by analogy, in the aesthetic itself. He 
argues that ‘we rejoice (actually we are relieved of a need)’ when 
scientific or we might also suggest, practical understanding, does 
discover ‘systematic unity among merely empirical laws’, because 
while they must be assumed in order to discover them in the first 
place, the assumption is subjective until it can be objectively proved 
in a given case (1987, 23-4).  
 
A classic example of the role of analogy in the natural sciences can be 
found in Darwin. While Darwin’s method is widely taken to be of the 
hypothetical-deductive kind it has also been argued that however he 
presented his findings, he also made significant use of analogous 
comparisons between particulars to develop the key planks of his 
theory. For example Darwin compared inherited variations of plants 
and animals artificially introduced through horticulture and 
agriculture for advantage by humans, with inherited variations 
developed by organisms in the wild to demonstrate that hereditary 
variations that are useful for the species tend to be reproduced over 
those that are less useful for survival. The analogy between natural 
selection and domesticated selection allowed Darwin to formulate a 
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general principle by close observation of concrete particulars within 
the domesticated production of plants and animals (where favorable 
selection was artificially controlled). 
 
Furthermore, Darwin’s hypothetical-deductive law-like premise that 
there is in nature a struggle for existence, derived from an analogous 
comparison with Malthus’s theories that a finite food resource ought 
to keep human population levels from infinitely expanding.  Again, 
from the analogy, Darwin made an inductive generalization to all 
natural populations (Darden 1982). As Darwin himself noted: ‘I came 
to the conclusion that selection was the principle of change from the 
study of domesticated productions; and then, reading Malthus, I saw 
at once how to apply this principle’ (quoted by Evans 1984, 114). 
 
There is a close relationship between analogy and induction but they 
are not the same thing.  Analogy works by establishing relations of 
resemblance and difference between particulars.  The inferential 
relation goes ‘sideways’ as it were, rather than from the particular to 
the general (induction) or the general to the particular (deduction). 
Yet induction is implied by the analogical correspondence that is 
established between two or more particulars. For the comparison 
suggests that there is a common derivation at some higher synthesis 
of the laws of nature that unites the particularities despite their 
differences (without which a comparison could not be made in the 
first place). 
 
Reflective judgment, as we have seen, is a cognitive power that 
enables us to subjectively attribute a harmony or unity of laws or 
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principles between empirical parts as a guide for genuine scientific 
knowledge.  Kant calls this subjective maxim of a priori unity, formal 
purposiveness.  
 
…the purposiveness of nature is a special a priori concept 
that has its origins solely in reflective judgment. For we 
cannot attribute to natural products anything like 
nature’s referring them to purposes, but can only use this 
concept in order to reflect on nature as regards that 
connection among nature’s appearances which is given to 
us in terms of empirical laws. This concept is also quite 
distinct from practical purposiveness (in human art or 
morality), though we do think it by analogy with practical 
purposiveness (1987, 20). 
 
On the one hand, Kant suggests that this transcendental principle 
‘merely reflects upon but does not determine objects’ (1987, 35), 
which is to say it is merely subjective. However elsewhere, in the first 
introduction to the Critique of Judgment, he gives an example that 
suggests how through an act of labor, this exercise of the imagination 
is transformed into a production of new nature that does imply 
precisely an objective (practical) determination of objects. 
 
For example, if we say that the crystal lens in the eye has 
the purpose of bringing about by means of a second 
refraction of light rays [the result] that the light rays 
emanating from one point will be reunited in one point of 
the retina of the eye, all we are saying is that our thought 
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of the causality nature [exercised] in producing an eye 
includes the thought of the presentation of a purpose, 
because such an idea serves us as a principle by which we 
can guide our investigation of the eye as far as its lens is 
concerned, and also because thinking the presentation of 
a purpose here might [help] us devise means to further 
that effect [if the natural lens does not do so adequately] 
(1987, 425). 
 
By the principle of formal purposiveness, we satisfy our need to 
subjectively regulate our relationship to empirical diversity and 
apparent contingency (why does the lens of the eye have the qualities 
it does?) by means of an assumption of a unity of purposes. In this 
example, formal purposiveness in fact has a dynamic relationship 
with practical purposes flowing into it and transforming itself from a 
merely subjective a priori maxim to guide the discovery of 
knowledge, into a real objective force. As Kant says, the presentation 
of a ‘purpose’ to the eye not only guides investigation but it also 
guides further technological adaptation of nature by humankind. 
Hence the presentation of a purpose enables us to ‘devise means’ to 
adapt nature (the production of artificial lenses, such as for glasses or 
magnifying instruments which Kant must have had in mind, but 
further down the historical line, the production of cameras for 
example). In such adaptations, a ‘universal’ comes into existence in 
the act of labor. A concept or assemblage of concepts, such as those 
that allow us to master the network of empirical laws that govern the 
human eye, determines the production of material nature (a 
magnifying glass for example). This ensemble of universal concepts 
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underpinned by determinative judgments, are only provisionally 
universal and only provisionally determinative (even in the natural 
sciences) and are constantly, through the historical process, being 
reworked in the course of modifying our practical and social 
relationships to nature. What brings Kant to the cusp of this 
materialist and even dialectical conception of the relationship 
between nature and culture, knowledge and productive forces, is the 
role analogy plays in comparing and contrasting nature’s ‘organized 
bodies’ with our own cognitive powers (formal purposiveness) and 
material productions (practical purposiveness). 
 
 
 
Marx and Reflective Judgment 
 
One can detect something like Kant’s thinking on determinative and 
reflective judgments in Marx’s attempts to formulate the method of 
his dialectical political economy in the Grundrisse. There, Marx argued 
that a concept like ‘population’ has a misleading universality about it. 
No doubt with Malthus in mind, Marx argues that the category of 
population can only lead critical thinking towards ‘ever thinner 
abstractions’ (1993, 100). Beneath its apparent universality, its ability 
to collate an aggregate of inhabitants within a given spatial area, the 
concept succeeds in subsuming the particular under it but at the cost 
of really engaging with its messy, contradictory material reality. 
Despite appearances then, on its own, the category of population, vis-
à-vis social scientific critical understanding, is precisely an example of 
a situation in need of reflective judgment, namely a situation when, as 
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Kant puts it, the universal is not given (despite appearances).  Marx’s 
solution to the problem of inadequate abstractions, is to propose the 
necessity of building up a network of interrelated concepts, none of 
which alone can stand in an adequate relation to the universal or 
general, but which can only attempt to do that as part of a complex 
whole. 
 
The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for 
example, the classes of which it is composed. These 
classes in turn presuppose exchange, division of labour, 
prices, etc. For example, capital is nothing without wage 
labour, without value, money, price etc. Thus if I were to 
begin with the population, this would be a chaotic 
conception [Vorstellung] of the whole…(1993, 100). 
 
In this conception, each category has only a provisional universality 
over the realities that each term denotes because each term depends 
on the network of other terms of which it is a part. Marx’s position is 
distinct from bourgeois empirical realism that sees concepts as 
discrete, isolated mirror reflectors of reality ‘out there’.  Similarly 
Kant described darstellung as the necessary process of construction 
by which an aspect of reality can be made sensible in a concept 
(Helfer 1996, 24).  There is however a difference between an 
uncritical or chaotic darstellung (what Marx terms above as 
Vorstellung) characterized by the determinative judgment and a 
critical darstellung, characterized by what Kant called the reflective 
judgment and what Marx describes as a process of ‘working-up’  
(1993, 101) a network of concepts. 
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For Marx, conceptual form always has the real as its point of 
departure, whether in the form of a chaotic abstraction (a 
determinative judgment), or something closer to the reflective 
judgment. The conceptual point of departure that will be most 
productive cannot be arbitrarily selected of course, but requires a key 
moment of choice. There is a world of difference between the thin 
abstraction of ‘population’ on the one hand, and the commodity 
exchanges of C-M-C on the other.  Marx chose the latter because the 
commodity is the ‘economic cell form’ of capital that requires the 
‘force of abstraction’ as the critical social scientific equivalent of the 
microscope to understand. The task of exhibition is then to work up 
to that most dialectical of things, concrete abstractions (or for Kant, 
reflective judgments, for Marx praxis). In Marx’s example, capital’s 
stratified reality is now conceived at an ontologically deeper and 
more complex level than the original point of departure (those thin 
abstractions or even C-M-C, a promising starting point, but only that). 
 
Marx’s presentation takes the form of an inductive conceptual 
dialectical reasoning that deconstructs the antithesis between 
abstraction and concreteness (as does of course, the aesthetic). For 
Marx, the concreteness of commodity exchange in everyday life, turns 
out to be an impoverished abstraction (although the pathway 
towards transcending that impoverishment in a way that ‘population’ 
was not). If for Marx, a critical social science requires the presentation 
(darstellung) of a ‘concrete abstraction’, then this could be an 
important clue as to why the aesthetic ought to be an attractive and 
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interesting site of pedagogic possibilities for the left, where precisely 
just such a darstellung can often be found. 
 
 
Reflective Judgment and the Aesthetic 
 
Marx’s critical social scientific research project refused to accept that 
the ‘universal’ was given within the language of political economy, or 
indeed other discourses such as the political, the ethical, etc. Similarly, 
Kant partially escapes his own tendency towards reifying the social 
by shifting from the philosophical equivalent of the hypothetical-
deductive model of the Critique of Pure Reason to a method of 
induction and analogy in Critique of Judgment.  Analogy and induction 
play a special role in the latter Critique because they are creative 
problem solving tools that admit the provisional nature of what we 
are discovering and even what we know. They work from the sensory 
or sensible to hypothesize about the supersensible (for us most 
importantly social relations that do not disclose themselves in 
immediate phenomenal forms) by inferential projection from what 
we do know or think we know (determinative judgments) to 
understand the meaning of things we do not know beyond or within 
what we thought we knew (reflective judgments). 
 
The inductive method is evident in the role of sensuousness (starting 
with the concrete), feeling and the judgment of the individual subject 
in Critique of Judgment. It builds towards larger patterns of meaning 
through the question of aesthetic form that is the basis of inter-
subjective communication of a kind quite different from the 
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mechanical objectivity of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s 
methodology deploys and assumes analogy to explicate what is 
distinctive about the pure aesthetic judgment of the beautiful by a 
series of comparisons and contrasts with a lower level of taste (the 
agreeable) and with moral judgments (the good). The patterns of 
resemblances and differences are tabulated below: 
 
 
 
The Agreeable  The Beautiful The Good 
Sensuous Sensuous Non-Sensuous 
Individual 
Interest 
Without Interest General Interest 
Subjective Subjective 
Universality 
Logical 
Universality 
Without or 
Impure Form 
Aesthetic Form Conceptual Form 
Gratification Pure Liking Esteem 
   
 
 
In Kant’s aesthetic philosophy, aesthetic form takes the role that 
critical conceptual form determination takes in Marx’s project. In the 
determinate judgment, the imagination is subordinated to the faculty 
of the understanding, playing a ‘reproductive’ role in harnessing the 
manifold of sense-impressions before they are stamped with the 
universal determination of ‘objective concepts’ by the understanding. 
In the reflective judgment the relation between the ‘presentational 
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powers [imagination and understanding]’ (Kant 1987, 61-2) is quite 
different.  In the aesthetic Kant argues:  
 
the cognitive powers brought into play by this 
presentation are in free play, because no determinate 
concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. 
Hence the mental state in this presentation must be a 
feeling, accompanying the given presentation, of a free 
play of the presentational powers directed to cognition in 
general (1987, 62). 
 
Thus in the aesthetic, the presentation, or perhaps better the 
darstellung is quite different from the determinative judgment, 
because now imagination is in free play with the understanding, 
transforming at least some selection of its taken for granted 
determinative judgments, into reflective judgments in which what is 
important is not the givenness of particular nailed down cognitions 
but the open-endedness or indeterminate quality of flexing the 
cognitive powers in general. When we remember that the faculty of 
the understanding should have a dual role in a Marxist reading of 
Kant, as both an allegory of reification and as a legitimate attempt at 
formulating a philosophy of nature, then it is clear that the notion that 
the imagination is in ‘free play’ with the understanding, suggests that 
Kant formulates a proto-materialist and not idealist philosophy of the 
aesthetic. The imagination is ‘in play’, that is in a subjectively creative 
relationship with the categorical framework of quantity, quality, 
causality and modality. The imagination is not autonomous from the 
faculty of the understanding. Furthermore, the dynamic relationship 
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Kant sets up between the imagination and the understanding marks a 
contradiction within his own argument that the reflective judgment 
and by extension the aesthetic is purely subjective. 
 
The supposed subjectivism of Kant’s argument about the aesthetic 
appears most problematically in his insistence that aesthetic 
judgment is ‘a liking unmediated by concepts’ (1987, 60) and that it 
does not give rise to cognition. This may seem to drive a powerful 
wedge between the aesthetic and the socio-political possibilities of 
aesthetic cognition. But if we understand the very specific and narrow 
sense of ‘concept’ and cognition that Kant has in mind, we can see 
how it actually aids the analogy with Marx’s critical social scientific 
project rather than frustrating it.  For Kant is right, if the aesthetic is 
to behave aesthetically, determinate concepts and determinate 
cognitions should not form the basis of its special formal operations.  
Working according to its own principles, what should be possible 
within the aesthetic are the development of critical concepts and 
critical cognitions. Conversely, when determinate concepts and 
cognitions do enter the formal structure of the aesthetic, then it 
becomes yoked to stereotypes and rigid ideological value-formations. 
Here we must amend Kant’s bald assertion that the aesthetic is 
uncoupled from social interests (1987, 45). Even when the aesthetic 
is working aesthetically and is not tied to reproducing value 
formations that correspond to reproducing broader social divisions, 
the aesthetic is always only able to open up a space for reflective 
judgment within for example, institutionally structured and class 
divided situations. Art cinema is a good example of this ambivalent 
position. Reflective judgment is judgment that can reflect on its own 
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material conditions of existence and it is this that makes it a principle 
close to Marx’s notion of praxis. In that reflection it lays the basis for 
changing those conditions and yet it is also always marked in its 
reflective nature by those very conditions. Here my argument 
converges with Jacques Ranciere who argues that the aesthetic 
demonstrates a critique of the idea that consciousness is merely a 
mechanical reflection of social being (2009, 16).  
 
In a mode of production as instrumentalized as capitalism, the 
aesthetic becomes attractive precisely because it is a potential space 
where the subject’s judgment matters and where in both the 
production and reception of the object, imagination has a greater 
‘play’.  While the real empirical subject has little active role in the 
operations of the faculty of the understanding, eclipsed as it is by the 
transcendental subject (Adorno 1995, 96) in the aesthetic mode, the 
subject develops a ‘very special power of discriminating and judging’ 
(Kant 1987, 44).  For Kant this power of discriminating and judging is 
uncoupled from ordinary cognition. It involves a kind of flexing of the 
subject’s judging and discriminating powers for their own sake 
(‘cognition in general’). Once we understand this as a comment on the 
cultural level of a civilization, its capacity (or incapacity) to 
universalize these very special powers (and universalize them outside 
the aesthetic as well as within the aesthetic) the materialist and 
critical potential of Kant’s philosophy of the aesthetic, becomes 
clearer. The special power that Kant refers to makes the aesthetic, at 
least potentially, a kind of training ground for critical thinking.  The 
nature of the unexpected discovery of meaning within the aesthetic 
may well include the discovery of what we ‘know’ but have not had 
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the opportunity to admit into our knowledge as sensuous experience. 
The widespread phenomenon of disavowal in consumer capitalism 
depends on the separation of sensuous experience from knowing. The 
subsumption of sense-impressions under concepts in the faculty of 
the understanding opens up a rift between concepts and experience 
that reflects the division of society into those whose elite experiences 
are unjustifiably universalized and therefore dominate those whose 
mass experiences are prevented from achieving universal conceptual 
recognition. When minority class experiences are the basis for 
conceptualizing the world universally, then those concepts are 
typically emptied of sensuous content in order to masquerade as 
universal. Hence the tendency of bourgeois thought towards abstract 
formalism, composed of hollowed out concepts (freedom, democracy, 
etc.,) that can preserve their unity and non-contradictory status only 
on condition that they shield themselves from engaging with the real 
sensuous content of life. Conversely, the real sensuous content of life 
struggles to find adequate expression, recognition and self-
recognition in a conceptual universe alien to it. 
 
It is significant then, in this context of a class rift between knowledge 
and experience that Kant insists on the singularity of the aesthetic 
experience, as if Kant were symptomatically alluding to the class 
division and reification that exists outside the aesthetic.  In the 
aesthetic there is no ‘rule’ that can persuade us that some thing is 
beautiful prior to its presentation to us, for ‘we want to submit the 
object to our own eyes, just as if our liking of it depended on that 
sensation’ (1987, 59). This insistence that judgment is grounded in 
the direct relationship between the experiencing subject and the 
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object of judgment is quite contrary to so much of our reified public 
sphere under late capitalism, where political, economic and military 
discourses circulate meanings that we are asked to assent to but 
which are uncoupled from the real experiences which those 
discourses imply or initiate. This uncoupling facilitates assent 
precisely because the human cost (of war or cuts in public services) is 
not really embodied in the ‘knowledge’ produced by these discourses. 
In the aesthetic mode, by contrast, judgment remains embodied in the 
sensuous experience itself. 
 
That aesthetic experience gives rise to judgment is one of the 
characteristics that differentiate it from mere sensual gratification 
(what Kant calls the agreeable) Sensual gratification remains private 
and requires no debate with others, beyond the expression that the 
subject finds this or that agreeable or disagreeable. With the 
agreeable ‘we allow everyone to be of a mind of his own, no one 
requiring…others to agree with his judgment of taste’ (Kant 1987, 
57).  With the beautiful sensuous experience is combined with a 
rigorous form. Aesthetic form differentiates the beautiful from the 
agreeable (which has either no form or a compromised and weak 
sense of form that Kant associates with ‘charms’) and is the basis for 
inter-subjective discussion. The price that Kant pays for this inter-
subjective discussion having a much freer basis than the objective 
judgments of the Critique of Pure Reason is that it is purely subjective. 
Nevertheless, despite its subjective nature, Kant posits the pure 
aesthetic judgment as one in which ‘we believe we have a universal 
voice, and lay claim to the agreement of everyone’ (1987, 59-60). In 
short the aesthetic is a realm where we can discuss important 
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questions that we assume are of universal or social significance and 
not merely the expression of private capriciousness. Aesthetic form is 
also what differentiates the aesthetic judgment from the moral 
judgment.  Moral judgments of ‘the good’ are based on concepts 
whose determinateness Kant would hope (vainly, given the dualistic 
structure of his philosophy) could be qualified by non-sensuous 
principles of reason. In the absence of precisely such qualification, 
Kant turns to the aesthetic. 
 
Where as in the determinate judgments of the understanding, form is 
imposed from the outside as it were by conceptual determination, in 
the aesthetic mode form achieves a structuring of experience that is 
inextricably connected with the singularity of the experienced object, 
thus to some extent overcoming the dualism between form and 
content that Lukács argued typified bourgeois philosophy in this 
epoch.  Aesthetic form constitutes ‘lawfulness without a law’ Kant 
argues (1987, 92), which is to say that it is analogous to a normative 
and political ideal in which the aesthetic object makes its own rules, 
generating it up from itself and instantiating it in its unified 
singularity. In this sense (generating the law or rule up from the 
particular) the aesthetic is a model of induction and Kant explicates it 
through a series of analogies between pure aesthetic judgments, 
empirical aesthetic judgments (of the agreeable, which have no 
universal possibilities) and moral judgments of the good, which do 
have universal scope but have no grounding in sensuous matter 
(which can only compromise it).  
 
 22 
In the aesthetic we ask what are the principles of connection that 
unifies this object and makes sense of its parts, parts that in turn, 
have the precise significance that they do precisely because of the 
web of interrelationships in which the principles of connection are 
embodied.  Kant grounds aesthetic pleasure in our common striving 
toward an aim, namely a meaningful connection – unity of purpose- 
between elements. As the aesthetic facilitates the development of 
such formal questions, so it may also facilitate the development of our 
cognitive powers with regard to social forms and relationships. Of 
course Kant’s thinking here is similar to such organic and ideological 
conceptions of society as Rousseau’s body politic. Yet the normative 
implications of the necessary inter-dependence of society in Rousseau 
and Kant do cut against the practical principles of atomization and 
separation typical of capitalism. Moreover, the dissolution of 
contradiction implied by the organic body metaphor is substantially 
modified by the subsequent development of cultural technologies like 
the moving image where editing, in a move analogous with industrial 
modernity itself, breaks down and reassembles matter in ways that 
develop the imagination’s attunement to contradiction and dialectics 
in its ‘free play’ with the understanding (this ‘free play’ now 
understood as a historically and technologically mediated 
relationship to nature).  The great modernist thinkers of early cinema, 
Kracauer, Eisenstein, Balász and Benjamin all knew this. 
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Eagleton and the Ideology of the Aesthetic 
 
In contrast to my presentation of the Kantian aesthetic, which 
stresses its critical cognitive potential, Terry Eagleton has argued that 
the Kantian aesthetic is virtually synonymous with ideology. It will be 
useful to clarify further my argument about the Kantian aesthetic to 
explore this disagreement.   Eagleton’s broader critique of the 
ideology of the aesthetic is to cast what I have been presenting as a 
bottom up (inductive) sensuous exploration of ‘laws’, as a hegemonic 
project in which the concepts of the ruling order fashion a discourse 
which can make sense of the terrain of ‘passion and perception’ 
(Eagleton 1997, 14). This is the whole affective life of the subject 
which the ruling order needs to be able to speak to and orchestrate if 
a successful shift in the modality of domination, from the coercion of 
absolutism to consent, is to be made.  Although Eagleton 
acknowledges in places that the aesthetic is ‘a dangerous, ambiguous 
affair’ (1997, 28) the thrust of his argument stresses its successful 
hegemonic function (perhaps because he is focusing on critical 
discourses of the aesthetic more than aesthetic cultural production). 
This emphasis closes off a more productive Marxist engagement with 
Kant’s aesthetic philosophy.  
 
I want to focus on two aspects of the aesthetic that loom large in 
Kant’s discussion of the beautiful, the question of the relationship 
between subjectivity and objectivity, and the relationship between 
sensuousness and conceptual abstraction. Eagleton comes perilously 
 24 
close in both of these aspects to suggesting that to establish some sort 
of reciprocal relationship between the paired terms in each case, is 
quintessentially an ideological move. I would suggest that because 
capitalism is characterized by the dualistic rupture between subject 
and object, sensuous particular and the abstract, that Marxists ought 
be extremely interested in theoretical and practical efforts to 
establish more productive relations between these terms.  
 
In terms of a philosophy of praxis, if we transpose Kant’s discussion 
of the aesthetic as a way of thinking about the constituent parts of 
our species being, namely that we are of nature, part of nature and 
immersed in the natural world and yet differentiated from nature by 
dint of our nature as social beings equipped with tremendous 
creative capacities, then Kant’s discussion of the aesthetic, 
contradictory as it is, begins to look like he is prefiguring Marx in 
some important respects. We can see a proto-materialist formulation 
in parts of Kant’s aesthetic not unlike Marx’s discussion of our 
‘metabolic’ relation to nature in Capital. Eagleton by contrast sees 
Kant’s aesthetic almost wholly as a form of ideological consolation. 
The extent to which it can be seen as a register in which 
subject/object relations different to the dualities of the Critique of 
Pure Reason can be gropingly formulated, is underplayed and cast as 
bourgeois wish-fulfillment:  
 
…in the aesthetic sphere, objects are uncovered which 
seem at once real yet wholly given for the subject, 
veritable bits of material Nature which are nevertheless 
delightfully pliant to the mind (1997, 78). 
 25 
 
Eagleton however tends to blur –through style – the distinction 
between ontological categories such as subject and object, essential 
really to any philosophy of praxis, and ideological renditions of those 
categories.  I would dispute Eagleton’s characterization that the 
Kantian aesthetic gives the object ‘wholly’ over to the subject, 
because the ‘play’ between the imagination and the understanding 
expressly contradicts this. But perhaps the reader’s hesitation here 
over ‘wholly’ is swept aside by that strategic use of ‘delightfully’ 
which in the fashion of Bakhtin’s dialogic class struggle, appropriates 
a key and recognizable word from the enemy (middle class taste) and 
inserts it here to rhetorically ramp up the critique of a bourgeois 
idealist over-inflation of subjectivity at the expense of the obdurate 
qualities of the object world. In so doing it is not clear whether 
Eagleton is critiquing Kant’s specific formulation of the aesthetic, or 
whether he sees any productive relationship between subject and 
object as essentially an ideological discourse.  
 
Eagleton’s stylistic strategies that obfuscate such distinctions are 
compounded by his conceptual underpinnings that are hard to 
square with the classical Marxist tradition. Kant’s aesthetic he argues  
offers a consoling account of a centered human subject ‘in an 
imaginary relation to a pliable, purposive reality, thereby granting it 
a delightful sense of its own inner coherence and confirming its 
status as an ethical agent’ (1997, 98). According to Eagleton the 
notion of the human subject having a purposive relation to a 
relatively ordered external reality such that it can make some aspects 
of it ‘pliable’, which in turn raises ethical questions over the choices 
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we make, is thoroughly ideological (note that word ‘delightful’ again). 
Yet some version of this model – discredited as it is within the 
Lacanian discourse Eagleton here invokes to critique the ‘centered’ 
subject – is necessary if we are to have any rational discussion about 
history and society. If Eagleton believes that it is merely a consoling 
fantasy that the material world might be regarded as recoverable as 
the product of the active subject (collective and individual) then the 
trajectory of the argument is clearly outside the orbit of Marxism. 
Further, it is not even clear that the middle class taste formation that 
he has in mind is an accurate barometer of what Kant actually argues. 
 
Aesthetic judgment is then a kind of pleasurable free-
wheeling of our faculties, a kind of parody of conceptual 
understanding, a non-referential pseudo-cognition which 
does not nail down the object to an identifiable thing, and 
so is agreeably free of a certain material constraint (1997,  
85). 
 
This is rather a mis-characterization of Kant’s aesthetic which is 
presented as a somewhat irresponsible suspension of material reality 
that only the middle class could luxuriate in. In contrast I would argue 
that the dialectic that Kant explores in the free play between 
understanding and imagination hints at the way that reflective 
judgment might shift from formal purposiveness to practical 
purposiveness, at the possibility that is of the aesthetic mode 
functioning as a model, stimulus and guide for real practical activity.  
Note that Eagleton accepts unquestioningly the idea that Kant’s 
aesthetic is without conceptual and therefore without cognitive 
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content or implications. But when we remember that the aesthetic 
shares with both natural scientific methods and critical social 
scientific methods, an interest in induction and analogy, it becomes 
very hard to sustain the notion that the Kantian aesthetic is 
‘conceptless’. Instead, as I have argued, the aesthetic, if it is properly 
working aesthetically, sets to work on determinate concepts and de-
reifies them.  
 
However for Eagleton, the mediating work of the aesthetic as 
‘concrete thought or sensuous analogue of the concept (1988, 328) is 
dangerously close to the essence of bourgeois ideology and its 
hegemonic project. For Eagleton, the aesthetic is a rather more 
effective means of winning the battle of ideas than either civil society 
– which is too competitive, egoistical and materialistic – or the state – 
which is too obviously about coercion and power. The aesthetic 
provides a means whereby abstract doctrines and ideologies can 
interpellate subjects in ways that hit their guts, so to speak, 
combining a powerful affective dimension to those abstract doctrines 
that avoids the need for reflexive rationalization (‘that’s just the way I 
feel’) while providing such feelings with a universal righteousness 
that transcends mere subjective whim and particularity.  
 
In ideology and the aesthetic we stay with the thing itself, 
which is preserved in all its concrete materiality rather 
than dissolved to its abstract conditions; yet this very 
materiality, this uniquely unrepeatable form or body, 
comes mysteriously to assume all the compelling logic of 
a global decree (1997, 95). 
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Eagleton brilliantly articulates the manner in which the ideological 
stirs people up while insulating them from really reflecting on the 
assumptions behind their deeply felt concerns. But is this in fact also a 
description of the aesthetic? To say that the aesthetic can be a vehicle 
for ideology goes without saying, but to say that the aesthetic is 
inherently ideological because it unites abstraction with the 
perceptible/sensual as Eagleton does, really closes off an important 
resource for the left. Indeed, given the way capitalism’s tendency 
towards abstraction massively increases the disjunctive relations 
between concept world and experience in any class divided mode of 
production, then the aesthetic is a crucial pedagogic resource. This 
ability to relativize concepts and make abstractions from experience, 
as well as the ability to see alterations in the physical appearance of 
things as a register of social relations (through a close up or editing 
for example in film) has been central to what has attracted 
generations of Marxist cultural theorists and practitioners (from 
Eisenstein to Jameson) to the aesthetic mode (and film in particular). 
Unlike Kant’s reason, the aesthetic combines free (but not 
autonomous) deliberation with a sensuous manifestation thus 
overcoming the divide between the sensible and the supersensible, or 
as Brecht put it: ‘making possible the concrete, and making possible 
abstraction from it’ (1988, 82).  
 
 Where abstract doctrines such as sexism and racism acquire a felt, 
lived power through aesthetics, ideology is hijacking the aesthetic and 
negating some of the characteristics that make the aesthetic, 
aesthetic. Engagement with the particularity of lived experience for 
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example becomes highly selective and narrow. From Gaye Tuchman’s 
‘symbolic annihilation’ of women to Edward Said’s critique of 
Orientalism, the narrow social basis on which representation is 
founded reveals itself in the aesthetic as a pseudo-engagement with 
the particular and is the pseudo-sensuous counterpart to the 
emptying out of discursive language of any real substantive content in 
favor of formalism. A film like The Mummy (1999) conforms to the 
racial Othering which Said analyzed in Orientalism. The white British 
and American characters are presented as daring, adventurous, brave, 
ingenious and resourceful, exactly the sort of people in whose hands 
the treasures they seek and find should belong, while their presence 
in Egypt is only ever cast in terms of the threat which others (the 
natives) pose to them, not what threat they pose to the native.  The 
native by contrast, when they come out of the background of the 
mise-en-scene, are sneaky, cunning, cowardly, threatening and power 
hungry, exactly the sort of people who need to be kept in line by 
civilized and knowledgeable white westerners.  The film was a 
Universal Pictures production and as well as film sequels, video 
games on Playstation 2 and other platforms were released off the 
back of its success. Universal Pictures is a subsidiary of General 
Electric, the energy corporation that signed a $3 billion dollar 
contract with the Iraqi government to provide power generation 
equipment and services in 2009. Needless to say, GE did not have a 
market in Iraq before the 2003 invasion by the US and the UK. Clearly 
then the yoking of the aesthetic to ideology involves us in economic, 
political and military power that must win consent to the exercise of 
those powers and at least passive tolerance to its goals and methods. 
Yet the occlusion of the real Arab subject is a sure sign that The 
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Mummy is a vehicle for ideology rather than an example of the 
inherently ideological nature of the aesthetic. In violation of the 
working up of ‘universals’ from the concrete particular, here we have 
the precise opposite, where the a priori determinative judgment ‘we 
whites are superior’) masquerades as an inductive process.  This in 
no way correlates with Kant’s reflective judgment. Instead it is 
motivated by a preexisting and rigidly a priori value system closed to 
experiential learning (including mediated experiential learning). It is 
very far from the  ‘indeterminate’ quality Kant finds characteristic of 
the aesthetic. Eagleton interprets Kant’s concept of the 
‘indeterminate’ as a complacent middle class refusal to engage with 
the real world and as symptomatic of a resistance to theoretical and 
conceptual language that cognitively ‘determines’ the nature of 
things. But again, Eagleton has missed the precise sense and meaning 
by which Kant is contrasting ‘determinate’ judgments with critical 
and provisional ‘indeterminate’ ones, and therefore missing the de-
reifying potential of the indeterminate. 
 
In the determinative judgment, the universal remains disjunctive 
with the particular or simply assimilates it and in either case refuses 
to allow the particular to impact on and shape the universal. In short 
contact with the Arab other is not going to lead to a reassessment of 
white western preconceptions in a film like The Mummy. The 
relationship between particular and universal, the experiential and 
the abstract, is radically different in the two kinds of judgment. 
Eagleton however does not distinguish between the two. For him, the 
‘universal voice’ that the subject finds in the aesthetic is one that is 
analogous to the way ‘gut feelings’ are given the status of universal 
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and incontrovertible truth so typical of ideology. Yet the analogy is 
inexact in crucial ways.  For what Kant is suggesting is that the 
‘universal voice’ with which we speak is precisely our capacity for 
discussion, precisely our capacity not to just accept what is given 
(those a priori judgments), precisely a universal that retains its 
material ground and is therefore always provisional, precisely the 
capacity for us to imagine nature and social relations differently from 
the way they have been constituted for us previously and by 
historical conditions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Critique of Judgment represents an incomplete and unfinished 
methodological break in Kant’s philosophy, one that involves 
prioritizing induction and analogy. This methodological shift is 
legitimated by the topic, namely the aesthetic, which becomes a kind 
of model for the realm of human praxis that is missing from Kant’s 
earlier philosophy.  Because its method is inductive the aesthetic 
retains a vital link to what is happening on the material ground of 
social life. Kant’s critical discourse on the aesthetic uses analogy to 
try and overcome the compartmentalization of social practices that 
otherwise structures his philosophy. Through analogy and induction 
Kant is able to formulate the concepts of reflective judgment and 
purposiveness that break with or allow for the de-reification of the 
determinative judgment that dominates the Critique of Pure Reason. 
The reflective judgment assumes a unity of laws which it cannot 
prove but which guides its mode of enquiry. It is therefore subjective, 
orientated towards discovery and the solving of problems and a 
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stimulant to the imagination as an aid in doing that. The aesthetic 
works, when it is genuinely working aesthetically, in a way similar to 
Marx’s darstellung, inductively up, not from concepts but from 
sensuous experience (which however are shot through with 
concepts, just as Marx’s concepts are shot through with everyday 
sensuous experience). The aesthetic, when it is working aesthetically 
(that is not hijacked by ideology) works up that sensuous content 
according to the principles of reflective judgment that de-reify the 
determinate concepts impregnated within the sensuous experience.  
In this the aesthetic is similar to the critical social science of Marx’s 
project, except aesthetic form determination has much greater scope, 
much greater ‘play’ in relation to the categorical framework of the 
understanding than Marx’s critical social science project or the 
natural sciences (and this is what makes it imaginative rather than 
scientific). 
 
Reflective judgment is precisely what the aesthetic facilitates as well 
as embodies, reconnecting the cognitive and emotional/sensuous 
circuits broken by the more instrumental discourses of politics and 
economics and the damage which they initiate. In this sense we need 
to think about the aesthetic as reparative in a way that is not 
captured by the Marxist notion of the aesthetic as performing 
imaginary resolutions of real contradictions. The aesthetic opens up 
a different public sphere – its subjective dimension is precisely what 
we may say allows it the scope and space denied by those practices 
closer to the economic and political reproduction of the system; at 
the same time this ‘subjective’ dimension is not to be conflated with 
individual subjectivity – the aesthetic has a collective and public 
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profile and objectivity that goes beyond what Kant calls the merely 
private taste of the agreeable. This public sphere, this reparative 
dimension means that paradoxically, the aesthetic is characterized by 
what Ranciere calls dissensus, since it undoes the hierarchies and 
divisions that customarily endure (2009, 3). Cultural Marxism must 
retain its ideology critique but an engagement with Kant can help it 
to discover that the aesthetic is not synonymous with ideology. 
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